Rural Metro Corp and Ensuring Fairness in a Fairness Opinion by Combelic, Riley
Denver Law Review Forum 
Volume 92 Article 7 
4-29-2015 
Rural Metro Corp and Ensuring Fairness in a Fairness Opinion 
Riley Combelic 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlrforum 
Recommended Citation 
Riley Combelic, Rural Metro Corp and Ensuring Fairness in a Fairness Opinion, 92 Denv. L. Rev. F. (2015), 
available at https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/2015/4/29/rural-metro-corp-and-ensuring-
fairness-in-a-fairness-opinion.html 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Law Review Forum by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, 
please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
79 
RURAL METRO CORP AND ENSURING FAIRNESS IN A 
FAIRNESS OPINION  
Riley J. Combelic* 
 
Directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to shareholders.2 
With respect to the duty of care, courts apply the presumption of the 
business judgment rule. This presumption assumes directors’ make deci-
sions in good faith, in the best interests of shareholders, and on a fully 
informed basis.3 Delaware courts, however, have reduced the duty of 
care to a simple process standard.4 Thus, so long as board decisions ap-
pear to be informed, courts will uphold them. As a result, courts have 
rarely found inadequate process and imposed liability for breach of the 
duty of care.5   
The Delaware Court of Chancery, however, took an unexpected turn 
in In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders’ Litigation.6 The case received 
considerable attention because the court ordered $75.8 million in damag-
es against an investment bank for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduci-
ary duties.7 Less discussed is the decision’s expansion of directors’ obli-
gations under the duty of care.8 In Rural, the court found the board of 
  
 * J.D. candidate at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, May 2015. 
 2. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment 
Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 974 (1994) (stating Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891), held 
directors should be held to the actions of “ordinarily prudent and diligent men.”). 
 3. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of 
discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the 
decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.”) (citations omitted), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).   
 4. The same can be said of the duty of loyalty.  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty without 
Limits: "Independent” Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 Ken. L.J. 53, 57 
(2007). 
 5. Horsey, supra note 2, at 978 (“Commentators who surveyed duty of care decisional law 
through the 1970s identified only a handful of cases outside the context of financial institutions in 
which directors of business corporations had been found liable for breach of their duty of care.”). 
 6. In re Rural Metro Corp. S’s Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).  
 7. See Tom Hals, Delaware Judge Hits RBC with $76 Million in Damages Tied to Ru-
ral/Metro Deal, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2014, 6:26 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/us-
rbc-judgment-idUSKCN0HZ2DC20141010; Key Lessons from the Rural Metro Delaware Case, 
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.sidley.com/en/news/key-lessons-from-the-rural-
metro--delaware-case-03-17-2014. 
 8. In order to invoke the business judgment rule and effectively fulfill their duty of care, 
directors must: “inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information 
reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in 
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directors breached its duty of care by approving the sale of the company 
without adequately supervising the negotiation process.9 This failure, in 
large part, resulted from inadequate oversight of the company’s financial 
advisor.10 Specifically, the court found the board did not take actions to 
mitigate or control the financial advisor’s conflicts of interest—some of 
which the board was aware.11  
This paper will discuss the existing case law describing the obliga-
tions of directors surrounding the negotiation and approval of a transac-
tion—specifically concerning the oversight of investment banks and the 
conflicts such relationships create. First, it will detail the pertinent devel-
opment of the duty of care in Delaware jurisprudence. Then it will dis-
cuss the role of investments banks within the process standard of the duty 
of care. Finally, it will summarize and discuss Rural and the additional 
obligations Rural has created for directors.  
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF CARE IN DELAWARE  
Directors were originally liable only for fraudulent actions, willful 
misconduct, or gross negligence12 and not for “for mistakes of judg-
ment.”13 Courts, however, eventually imposed an obligation of care, re-
quiring directors to act in a manner “which ordinarily prudent and dili-
gent men would exercise under similar circumstances.”14  
Delaware courts adopted a somewhat different standard, requiring 
the board act with “reckless indifference.”15 In the absence of a conflict 
of interest, the courts imposed a strong presumption in favor of the 
  
the discharge of their duties.” Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858, 872 (Del. 1985) overruled by on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (2009). 
 9. Rural, 88 A.3d at 110. 
 10. Id. at 94. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 589, 
594–98 (2006) (“By this time, many courts, including the United States Supreme Court, had already 
held that the standard of care for directors was gross negligence.”).   
 13. Appeal of Spering, 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872) (“[Directors] are not liable for mistakes of judg-
ment, even though they may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are 
honest and provided they are fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the 
managing body.”). 
 14. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (finding “the degree of care to which [the 
directors] were bound is that which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar 
circumstances”).  The Model Business Corporation Act has a similar standard of care: “The mem-
bers of the board of directors or a committee of the board, when becoming informed in connection 
with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge 
their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under 
similar circumstances.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2010).   
 15. See Cole v. Nat'l Cash Credit Ass'n, 156 A. 183, 188 (Del. Ch. 1931) (“The inadequacy 
must be so gross as to lead the court to conclude that it was due not to an honest error of judgment 
but rather to bad faith, or to a reckless indifference to the rights of others interested.”).  Delaware 
courts, however, have not applied the standard uniformly. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. 
Corp., Civil Action No. 7547, 1987 WL 28436, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Dec.17, 1987) (finding when 
directors fail to act “the appropriate standard for determining liability is widely believed to be gross 
negligence, but a single Delaware case has held that ordinary negligence would be the appropriate 
standard.”).  
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board’s action. Courts recognized they are ill equipped to deal with com-
plex corporate decisions16 and need to protect outside directors, who of-
ten serve on a part-time basis, from board decisions that subsequently 
prove wrong.17  
Courts, therefore, presume the validity of board decisions through 
the application of the business judgment rule.18 The Delaware Supreme 
Court set out the classic formulation of the business judgment rule in 
Aronson v. Lewis.19 The rule presumes “that in making a business deci-
sion the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best inter-
ests of the company.”20 Boards have a duty “to inform themselves, prior 
to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably 
available to them.”21  
To set aside the presumption plaintiffs must demonstrate gross neg-
ligence.22 Where plaintiffs succeed in doing so, “the burden shifts to the 
defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged transaction, to 
prove to the trier of fact the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to the 
shareholder plaintiff.”23  
  
 16. Herbert S. Wander & Alain G. LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Transac-
tions and Today's Business Judgment Rule, 42 BUS. LAW. 29, 29–30 (1986) (“The business judg-
ment rule, therefore, provides corporate directors with the broad discretion to formulate dynamic 
corporate policies without fear of judicial second-guessing and is designed to prevent the judiciary 
from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decisionmaking, a task which they are ill-equipped 
to handle.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 17. Patricia A. Terian, "It's Not Polite to Ask Questions" in the Boardroom: Van Gorkom's 
Due Care Standard Minimized in Paramount v. QVC, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 887, 892–94 (1996) (“The 
business judgment rule stems from the judicial recognition of the realities of business decisions. The 
judiciary realized that it was unable to effectively assess complex corporate decisions in comparison 
to the corporation's directors. Consequently, a Delaware court will not ‘substitute its own notions of 
what is or is not sound business judgment’ in place of the director's superior judgment.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 18. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, 
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 410 n. 14 (2013) (citing authority for the proposition 
that the “business judgment rule concept in Delaware [traces] back to decisions from 1912, 1924, 
and 1935.”). 
 19. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  The concept, however, had appeared 
in earlier cases.  See Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business 
Judgment Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 10–11 
(2010). 
 20. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.   
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. “While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of 
care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated 
upon concepts of gross negligence.”   
 23. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (If a plaintiff is success-
ful in rebutting the business judgment rule, “the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the propo-
nents of the challenged transaction, to prove the trier of fact the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to 
the shareholder plaintiff.”).  Entire fairness requires directors to persuade the court the transaction 
was the product of both “fair dealing and fair price.” Babatunde M. Animashaun, The Business 
Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 16 S.U. L. Rev. 345, 352 
(1989). 
82 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 92 
A.  Directors’ obligations under the duty of care: Van Gorkom 
The business judgment rule is premised upon an informed board.24 
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,25 the court addressed the requirement.  In that 
case, shareholders challenged the board’s approval of a sale of the com-
pany in a cash-out merger.26 The approval process involved a single two-
hour meeting.27 Notice of the meeting did not include the purpose of the 
meeting and the directors did not receive the merger agreement or any 
written valuation of the company.28  
In asserting the board made an informed decision, the directors 
pointed to the price paid in the merger (particularly the premium), their 
experience, and the application of a market test.29 The court found these 
sources inadequate to render the board informed as to the value of the 
company.30 The directors, the court found, lacked any information on the 
intrinsic value of the company.31 
The decision had a direct impact on board behavior. The case em-
phasized the need for, and role of, financial experts when determining 
the fairness of the transaction.32 Van Gorkom “tells managers that they 
can insulate their decisions from subsequent attack, but only if they hire 
investment bankers and Delaware counsel to structure the appropriate 
procedural framework for the decisional process.”33 Van Gorkom, how-
  
 24. “Thus, the business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for 
all good faith board decisions.”  In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). 
 25. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 26. Id. at 864. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 869, 69.  
 29. Id. at 875. 
 30. The court, however, did not find that market tests, correctly applied, are not sufficient to 
demonstrate the fairness of a deal.  See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last 
Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1959 (2003) (“[T]he court spen[t] considerable time 
analyzing the validity of the market check and finally conclude[d] that the Trans Union/Marmon 
Group merger agreement never received an adequate market test. Moreover, the court was probably 
correct in this conclusion.”). 
 31. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876 (“There was no call by the board . . . for any valuation 
study or documentation of the $55 price per share as a measure of the fair value of the Company in a 
cash-out context. . . . [A]t no time did the board call for an evaluation study.”).  
 32. See Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.S, Corporate Law 
Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 626 
(2002) (“[O]ne universally acknowledged ramification of Smith v. Van Gorkom is an increase in 
demand for the services of lawyers and investment bankers who advise Delaware corporations.”); 
see also Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 649, 683 (1995) (“[T]he Van Gorkom court suggested that the use of an independent invest-
ment bank by the Trans Union Board to assist it in evaluating the fairness of the price being offered 
for the company would have aided the Board in precluding liability by helping it to meet the ‘in-
formed’ requirement of the business judgment rule.”).  
 33. Macey, supra note 27, at 626; see also Elson, supra note 27, at 683.  
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ever, said little about how a board should select or supervise an invest-
ment bank or assure the quality of a fairness opinion.34 
B.  Investments banks and boards  
Van Gorkom largely imposed a quantitative standard on directors.35 
Subsequent decisions provide little additional insight into the role of the 
board with respect to the supervision of financial advisors. Some courts 
acknowledged the importance of “overseeing the outside advice”;36 how-
ever, for the most part, courts did not impose an obligation on directors 
to pay close attention to the trustworthiness of fairness opinions by in-
vestment banks.37 
The need for, and importance of, board oversight is exacerbated by 
the potential for conflicts of interest between companies and financial 
advisors.38 In some cases, the conflicts arguably create a potential for 
financial advisers to favor the interests of management over those of 
shareholders. This occurs because investment banks have an incentive to 
provide the opinion sought by management out of a “desire to retain and 
  
 34. See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1573 (2006) (dis-
cussing the limitations of a fairness opinion including the subjectivity of such an opinion and the 
conflicts that often arise for investment banks).   
 35. See William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They and Why We Should Do 
Nothing About It, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 523, 527 (1992) (“The strong message was that boards could 
protect their decisions only if they met a quantitative standard of information set by the courts. Only 
if they met this threshold could they be permitted to say they had made an informed business judg-
ment.”) (footnotes omitted). Later Delaware decisions have deemphasized the need for experts in the 
decision making process.  After In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), 
“[f]or purposes of the duty of care and the business judgment rule, Van Gorkom is dead. . . .”  Henry 
N. Butler, Smith v. Van Gorkom, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of Random Mutations in 
the Evolution of Corporate Law, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 280–81 (2006).  This is especially true for 
the informed prong of the duty of care because even though the Delaware Court of Chancery found 
that “Disney directors had been taken for a wild ride, and most of it was in the dark,” it still did not 
find them to have been uninformed. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 736 (Del. 
Ch. 2005) aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 36. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 276 (2d Cir. 1986) (held 
“[t]he proper exercise of due care by a director in informing himself of material information and in 
overseeing the outside advice on which he might appropriately rely is, of necessity, a pre-condition 
to performing his ultimate duty of acting in good faith to protect the best interests of the corpora-
tion.”) 
 37. This was true at least with respect to the firms with “sufficient credentials.”  Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 Duke L.J. 
27, 43-44 (1989) (stating the neither the courts nor investment banks’ “concern for professional 
reputation [leads] investment banks to render unbiased fairness opinions.”) (internal citations omit-
ted).  
 38. Bankers “face significant conflicts of interest. Bankers are thus likely to use their discre-
tion to render opinions that serve the interests of managers.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, 
Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 37 
(1989) (noting “[s]ince banks are compensated primarily for services other than writing fairness 
opinions, they have incentives to render pro-management opinions even in situations involving 
noncontingent fees, because such opinions will typically generate more work than opposition opin-
ions. . . .  The difference in incentives between contingent and noncontingent fees is therefore only a 
matter of degree: investment banks compensated on the basis of work performed will face smaller 
(but still positive) incentives to generate pro-management opinions than will banks compensated on 
a contingent basis.”). 
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attract clients, and psychological and social factors,” which include in-
vestment banks' reputational concerns.39 
Other potential conflicts provide for the possible divergence be-
tween the company’s interests and those of its financial advisers. In par-
ticular, these conflicts arise out of “the fee structure for compensating 
investment banks and the incentives that structure creates.”40  
Often when banks provide a fairness opinion “a significant fraction 
of the total fee is payable on the condition that the transaction is con-
summated, and the size of this contingent fee may depend on the compa-
ny's sale price.”41 For the most part, contingency fees align the interests 
of financial advisers and shareholders.42 The arrangements reward finan-
cial advisers for securing the highest price, which in turn guarantees the 
highest payment for shareholders. 43 
In other circumstances, such a payment structure results in diver-
gent interests. Contingency “fees have been criticized for creating a con-
flict of interest [for] investment banks because the relative size of the 
[contingency] fee as compared to the [other] fee[s] may cause a bank to 
encourage a target to accept a price that does not adequately value the 
company for the sake of pushing any transaction through.”44 The degree 
of such a conflict depends on a number of factors, including the size of 
the contingency fee.45  
Conflict may also arise where the financial adviser seeks to partici-
pate in both sell-side advising and buy-side financing of a deal. This type 
of conflict arose in In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation.46  
There, Del Monte Foods Company (Del Monte) was the target company 
in an acquisition.47 During the bidding and sale process, Del Monte’s 
  
 39. Id. at 37. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 38 (“Although banks often receive a fixed fee for fairness opinions, other fees that 
investment banks receive are frequently contingent.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 42. See Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7046, 1991 WL 29303, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 7, 1991) (“Nor was [the investment bank’s] contingent fee arrangement viewed as creating a 
conflict, because that arrangement gave [the investment bank] an incentive to obtain the best availa-
ble price for all . . . stockholders.”). 
 43. See Bonnie White, If All Investment Banks are Conflicted, Why Blame Barclays? An 
Examination of Investment Bank Fee Structures and Del Monte Foods, 162 U. PA. L. Rev. Online 
93, 97 (2013) (“The payment of a success fee is contingent on the deal closing and is determined by 
a percentage of the total value of the deal.”). 
 44. Id. at 97. 
 45. See In re Tele-Commc'ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2006) (“[T]he contingent compensation of the financial advisor . . . of roughly 
$40 million creates a serious issue of material fact, as to whether [the financial advisor and its legal 
counsel] could provide independent advice . . . .”). 
 46. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 818 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 47. Id. at 817. 
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financial advisor took various actions, which evidenced the conflicts 
inherent in these types of deals.48  
First, the financial advisor, without the knowledge or consent of Del 
Monte’s board, reduced the “prospect” for competition by bringing two 
entities together, a private equity firm and a strategic buyer, and convinc-
ing them to make a joint rather than separate bid49—something both enti-
ties had expressly contracted not to do.50 Second, the financial advisor 
failed to disclose to Del Monte its intention to seek a position as a buy-
side financer of the deal. 51 As a result, “at the same time [the financial 
advisor] was negotiating [for a higher price per share], [it] had an incen-
tive as a well-compensated lender to ensure that a deal was reached and 
that [the buyers] did not overpay.”52   
The court found that “[d]espite [the special committee’s] independ-
ence, the directors failed adequately to oversee the process and permitted 
the conflicted management team and their financial advisor to exploit the 
opportunities it presented.”53 Thus, “[b]y failing to provide the serious 
oversight that would have checked Barclays' misconduct, the directors 
breached their fiduciary duties. . . .”54 Del Monte demonstrated the need 
for directors to have the prescribed “active and direct role in the sale 
process.”55  
II.  RURAL’S ADDITION TO THE DUTY OF CARE 
Del Monte demonstrated the need for greater oversight of financial 
advisors. In particular, boards needed to be more aware of conflicts aris-
ing out of the interest of financial advisors participating in both the sell-
side advising and buy-side financing of a deal. The case, however, did 
not address all conflicts that could arise. In In re Rural Metro Corp. 
Stockholders’ Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court addressed direc-
  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 823 (“By pairing Vestar with KKR, Barclays put together the two highest bidders 
from March 2010, thereby reducing the prospect of real competition in any renewed process.”).   
 50. Id. at 821 (both companies were subject to a confidentiality agreement that contained a 
“no teaming provision” and prohibited certain agreements with other potential bidders absent “prior 
written consent” from Del Monte).   
 51. Id. at 820. (“[Barclays employee] also did not mention that Barclays planned from the 
outset to seek a role in providing buy-side financing. . . .  The Board did not learn that Barclays 
intended from the outset to have a buy-side role until discovery in this litigation.”).  
 52. Id. at 833. Del Monte’s board was later asked to approve both of the financial advisors 
actions, however, the board was never informed that the financial advisor had intended to take both 
actions from the outset.  
 53. Id. at 836. 
 54. Id. at 818. (However, the court also stated “[t]o hold that the Del Monte directors 
breached their fiduciary duties for purposes of granting injunctive relief does not suggest, much less 
pre-ordain, that the directors face a meaningful threat of monetary liability.” ) 
 55. Id. at 835. 
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tors’ oversight obligations with respect to the structural conflicts of inter-
ests of investment banks when there is only one bid in an acquisition.56     
A. The case. 
In Rural, shareholders of Rural, a company that provided ambu-
lance and fire protection services in multiple states, filed suit against the 
board of directors (the Board) for breach of fiduciary duties arising out of 
the approval of a merger with Warburg Pincus LLC (WP).57 Rural 
Shareholders also made claims against financial advisors, RBC Capital 
Markets (RBC) and Moelis and Company LLC (Moelis), for aiding and 
abetting. Prior to trial, the Board and Moelis settled, leaving only RBC as 
a defendant.58  
The matter began when the Board created a special committee to 
consider acquiring American Medical Response (AMR), a subsidiary of 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and a competitor of Rural. The pos-
sible purchase was directly in line with the Rural’s growth strategy of 
expansion through acquisitions, but the deal never materialized.59  
With rumors developing about the sale of EMS, RBC believed Ru-
ral might also be subject to an acquisition. The possibility had the poten-
tial to benefit RBC. As the court noted, RBC “correctly perceived that 
the firms [interested in purchasing EMS] would think they would have 
the inside track on Rural if they included RBC among the banking fi-
nancing their bids for EMS.”60  
On December 8, 2010, the Board reactivated the special committee 
and charged it with generating a recommendation on an appropriate 
course of action.61 The special committee considered retaining a number 
of financial firms, including RBC, and held multiple interviews.62 During 
its interview, RBC disclosed an interest in offering staple financing to 
any potential buyer.63 Counsel advised the special committee that any 
  
 56. In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014), decision clarified on 
denial of reargument, No. 6350-VCL, 2014 WL 1094173 (Del Ch. Mar. 19, 2014). 
 57. Id. at 64. 
 58. Id. at 63. The Board settled for $6.6 million and Moelis settled for $5 million. Stipulation 
and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement Between Plaintiff, the Rural/Metro Defendants and 
Moelis & Company LLC, In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (No. 
6350-VCL), 2013 WL 4027958.  
 59. Rural, 88 A.3d at 65. Nor did an October of 2010 approach from private equity firms that 
offered to buy Rural. Id. at 64. 
 60. Id. at 91. 
 61. Id. at 67. 
 62. Id. at 67-68.  
 63. Id. at 66–67. Staple financing is a financing package offered to potential bidders in an 
acquisition. It is often pre-arranged by the investment bank advising the selling company and in-
cludes all details of the lending package, including the principal, fees, and loan covenants. See 
White, supra note 38, at 96.  RBC did not disclose to the board plans to use its position to secure a 
position in the financing trees of firms bidding for EMS.  Rural, 88 A.3d at 68 (“RBC did not dis-
close that it planned to use its engagement as Rural's advisor to capture financing work from the 
bidders for EMS.”). 
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investment bank seeking to provide staple financing would “present . . . 
potential conflicts of interest, and potential appearances of conflicts.”64 
Additionally, counsel noted, “if the Committee were to select RBC, [it] 
would need to be especially active and vigilant in assuring the integrity 
of the [process] . . . .”65 The special committee ultimately decided to re-
tain RBC.66 
Although not authorized to do so, the special committee put Rural 
in play by seeking outside offers.67 Within two months, Rural had re-
ceived six preliminary bids.  Feedback from some private equity firms 
suggested that Rural’s price could increase if its growth strategy had 
more time to develop.68 Additionally, the concurrent sales of Rural and 
EMS had the potential to limit the likelihood for offers from firms bid-
ding on EMS; however, the special committee continued the sale pro-
cess.69  
With the deadline for final bids only a few days away, the Board 
met for the first time since empowering the special committee.70 It retro-
actively granted the special committee the authority to move forward 
with a deal and declined to extend the deadline for final bids.71  
Ultimately, Rural received only a single final offer. WP offered 
$17.00 per share, a premium over the prior day’s closing price of 
$12.38.72 At the same time, CD & R, the firm that purchased EMS, ex-
pressed interest in making an offer but indicated a need for more time.73 
The special committee decided not to wait for CD & R and directed RBC 
to pursue final negotiations with WP.74  
During the pendency of the negotiations, RBC engaged in “last mi-
nute efforts to solicit a buy-side financing role from [WP]”75 and offered 
WP a $65 million revolving line of credit for one of its portfolio compa-
nies.76 Additionally, RBC lowered its fairness range, thereby making the 
  
 64. Id. at 68. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 69 (“On December 26, 2010, Shackelton sent an update to the Board reporting that 
the Special Committee had hired ‘RBC (as primary) and Moelis (as secondary) [advisors].”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 70. Not all members of the special committee received this information. 
 69. Id. (“It should have been clear from the outset, . . . that financial sponsors who participat-
ed in the EMS process would be limited in their ability to consider Rural simultaneously because 
they would be constrained by confidentiality agreements they signed as part of the EMS process and 
because EMS would fear that any participants in both processes would share EMS's confidential 
information with its closest competitor.”). 
 70. Id. at 72–73. 
 71. Id. at 73–74. 
 72. Id. at 74 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 72–73. 
 75. Id. at 94. 
 76. Id. at 76–77. 
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price offered by WP more attractive to the Board.77 Ultimately, WP did 
not include RBC in its financing tree but did increase the purchase price 
to $17.25.78   
The Board, in a joint meeting with the special committee, met at 
approximately 11:00 pm on March 27, 2011.79 At the meeting, the Board, 
for the first time in the entire process, received RBC’s valuation analysis 
of the deal.80 After convening for 78 minutes, it approved the transac-
tion.81  
B.  The court’s holding 
The subsequent litigation centered on the aiding and abetting claims 
against RBC. To establish a claim for aiding and abetting, shareholders 
must identify a breach of fiduciary duty by the board.82 The court fo-
cused on the Board’s supervision of the sale process while determining if 
there was a breach.83  
The court emphasized that boards are required to take an active role 
in the oversight process.84 Directors are “not expected to have the exper-
tise to determine a corporation’s value for themselves, or have the time 
or ability to design and carry out a sale process.”85 Instead, the task often 
falls to financial advisors who serve as “gatekeepers.”86 Nonetheless, 
directors cannot be “passive instrumentalities” and instead are required 
to provide “active and direct oversight” of a merger process.87  
In applying these duties, the court analyzed the directors’ decision 
to hire RBC. The court discussed the directors’ failure to take action after 
learning of RBC’s intention to pursue buy-side financing.88 Directors, in 
this context, have an obligation “to learn about actual and potential con-
flicts faced by directors, management, and their advisors.”89 The court 
stressed, “directors must act reasonably to identify and consider the im-
  
 77. Id. at 78 (The day before the Board approved the merger RBC worked to make the deal 
look more attractive. “The combined effect of [RBC] lowering ‘consensus’ adjusted EBITDA by 
$6.7 million and lowering the low-end multiple from 7.5x to 6.3x was dramatic. On Saturday morn-
ing, the ‘consensus’ precedent transaction range was $13.31 to $19.15. On Saturday afternoon, it 
was $8.19 to $16.71, entirely below the deal price.”).  
 78. Id. at 76. 
 79. Id. at 78-79. 
 80. Id. at 79. 
 81. Id at 95–96. 
 82. Id. at 80. 
 83. Id. at 103-06. 
 84. Id. at 89. 
 85. Id. at 88.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 89–90. 
 88. Id. at 90. 
 89. Id. at 90 (stating the role of independent directors is especially important in making sure 
management, and professionals like investment bankers, are impartial). 
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plications of the investment banker's compensation structure, relation-
ships, and potential conflicts.”90   
Here, the Board was unaware of the RBC’s efforts to provide fi-
nancing in the EMS acquisition.91 The Board was aware, however, of 
RBC’s desire to provide staple financing to any purchaser and the con-
tingent nature of the compensation paid to the financial advisor.92 The 
compensation raised concerns in circumstances involving only a single 
offer. As a result, the court suggested the Board had particularly mean-
ingful oversight obligations in the “final stages of the negotiations.”93 
Directors had a fiduciary obligation to consider whether any offer was 
appropriate, even if doing so resulted in the failure to trigger the contin-
gent compensation otherwise paid to the financial advisor.      
III.  RURAL’S EFFECT 
Rural mostly focused on the role of financial advisors in the sale of 
the company. The court viewed the process as tainted by the financial 
advisor’s conflict of interest.  The Board knew of some of the conflicts, 
such as RBC’s desire to provide staple financing,94 others, such as the 
payment of a contingency fee, were structural. 95 These factors had the 
potential to cause the interests of the company and the adviser to di-
verge.96  
Recognizing this potential for divergence, the court emphasized at 
least two sets of responsibilities.  First, boards must take greater steps to 
uncover actual conflicts of interest by financial advisors. In particular, 
the court in Rural was concerned with potential conflicts arising from the 
desire to provide financing to the purchaser and to use the role as sell-
side advisor to gain access to the financing tree in another acquisition.97  
  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 107 (“Only RBC knew the full extent of its conflicts, including its successful plan to 
use the Rural sale process to gain a place on the financing trees of the bidders for EMS and its late-
stage push for a buy-side financing role from Warburg, including feverish discussions with Warburg 
on March 26, 2011, the day before the merger was approved and the same day that RBC was finaliz-
ing its valuation work.”).   
 92. Id. at 68. 
 93. Id. at 94. 
 94. See White, supra note 38, at 96 (“Staple financing has been criticized for creating a con-
flict of interest for bankers who, on the one hand, seek as sell-side advisors to maximize the price 
paid to the target's stockholders, and on the other, want as a creditor to ensure that an acquirer will 
be able to repay its financing obligations.”).  
 95. Id. at 97. (“Success fees have been criticized for creating a conflict of interest on the part 
of investment banks because the relative size of the success fee as compared to the transaction fee 
may cause a bank to encourage a target to accept a price that does not adequately value the company 
for the sake of pushing any transaction through.”). 
 96. Id. (“The potential for conflicts has caused some commentators to argue that ‘the invest-
ment banker will have an economic incentive to persuade the seller to sell the business even if the 
price is low or the non-price terms are unfair to the seller . . . .”).  
 97. Rural, 88 A.3d at 91 (“Setting aside this fundamental problem, the decision to initiate a 
sale process fails the enhanced scrutiny test because RBC did not disclose that proceeding in parallel 
with the EMS process served RBC's interest in gaining a role on the financing trees of bidders for 
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Second, the court recognized a boards’ obligation to take into ac-
count structural conflicts that can cause interests to diverge. In particular, 
boards must be mindful of the conflicts that arise when “a bank is asked 
to opine and advise on a transaction that it stands to benefit from only if 
the transaction transpires.”98 This conflict is most likely to occur when 
the board receives only a single bid. In order to fulfill this obligation, 
boards will have to take an even more “active and direct role in the sale 
process.”99 
After Rural, a board’s hiring process of a financial adviser will re-
quire increased due diligence.  Now, a board must inquire about these 
types of actual and potential conflicts. In addition, the process may re-
quire a more thorough awareness of a firm’s business, including the dis-
closure of any current and potential clients.100  
In addition, boards must seek to reduce the risk of such conflicts. 
They should require financial advisors, at the time of retention, to repre-
sent that no conflicting relationships exists. To the extent a conflict aris-
es, the agreement should further mandate notice to the board or special 
  
EMS. . . . Although a well-informed board might have considered these issues and reasonably decid-
ed to pursue a near term sale process, neither the Board nor the Special Committee made such a 
decision. Shackelton and RBC unilaterally put Rural into play, and RBC was motivated by a desire 
to secure its place in the financing trees of the bidders in the EMS auction. Based on the totality of 
the evidence, the initiation of a sale process in December 2010 fell outside the range of reasonable-
ness.”). 
 98. Davidoff, supra note 29, at 1587 (stating general contingency fee structures do not pay 
investment banks unless they find a deal to be fair and that the problem is not solved by simply 
keeping the fairness opinion fee separate from the success fee because the success often dwarfs the 
fairness opinion fee). 
 99. Delaware law has historically required a board to take an active and direct role in the sale 
process.  See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 835 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Dela-
ware law requires that a board take an ‘active and direct role in the sale process.’ “). 
 100. Id. at 832. (“Because of the central role played by investment banks in the evaluation, 
exploration, selection, and implementation of strategic alternatives, this Court has required full 
disclosure of investment banker compensation and potential conflicts. This Court has not stopped at 
disclosure, but rather has examined banker conflicts closely to determine whether they tainted the 
directors' process.”) (citing In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., Civil Action No. 
758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *16 (Del.Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (emphasizing importance of disclosure of 
potential banker conflict of interest and explaining that “[t]here is no rule ... that conflicts of interest 
must be disclosed only where there is evidence that the financial advisor's opinion was actually 
affected by the conflict”); Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis, C.A. No. 3694–VCN, 2008 WL 
5048692, at *8 (Del.Ch. June 27, 2008) (“[I]t is imperative for the stockholders to be able to under-
stand what factors might influence the financial advisor's analytical efforts.... For that reason, the ... 
benefits of the Merger to [the investment bankers,] beyond its expected fee, must also be disclosed to 
... stockholders.”); see also In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114 (Del.Ch.2007) (requir-
ing disclosure of CEO conflict of interest where CEO acted as negotiator; “Put simply, a reasonable 
stockholder would want to know an important economic motivation of the negotiator singularly 
employed by a board to obtain the best price for the stockholders, when that motivation could ration-
ally lead that negotiator to favor a deal at a less than optimal price, because the procession of a deal 
was more important to him, given his overall economic interest, than only doing a deal at the right 
price.”); see also, Lessons of Del Monte Foods for Companies Running (or Considering) a Sale 
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committee. Finally, the agreement should specifically prohibit the firm 
from participating in certain types of transactions such as the financing 
syndicate of any purchaser or competitor.  
Boards must also take into account the inherent conflict that arises 
out of the system of compensation.101 This is especially true where—as 
was the case in Rural—only one bid surfaces.102 In such cases, directors 
must seriously consider the option of taking no offer at all, something 
that will negatively affect financial advisors paid on a contingency ba-
sis.103  
Rural adds to the lessons from Del Monte. Directors should pause 
when dealing with the structural conflicts that exist in financial advisor 
agreements. Additionally, this is one step closer to what many argue is 
the only way to extinguish such conflicts which is to “require a funda-
mentally different fee structure for investment bankers working on such a 
sale, and ultimately [eliminate] success fees and staple financing.”104 
 
  
 101. In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1023 n.46 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“In 
general, however, it is advisable that investment banks representing sellers not create the appearance 
that they desire buy-side work, especially when it might be that they are more likely to be selected 
by some buyers for that lucrative role than by others.”). 
 102. Davidoff, supra note 29, at 1586–87 (“The investment bank therefore has a hefty incen-
tive to ensure that the contemplated transaction for which it will issue a fairness opinion progresses 
to completion. But, conflict arises where a bank is asked to opine and advise on a transaction that it 
stands to benefit from only if the transaction transpires.” ) 
 103. Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 835–36 (“[T]he role of outside, independent directors becomes 
particularly important because of the magnitude of a sale of control transaction and the possibility, in 
certain cases, that management [and here I add other contingently compensated professionals like 
investment banks] may not necessarily be impartial.”) (citations omitted).  
 104. White, supra note 38, at 94.  
